ZOG, Military Manpower and a Draft?

The U.S. Department of Defense is having chronic personnel problems, no doubt about it.  Unlike previous periods of personnel chaos this manpower crisis is not confined to the enlisted ranks.  It extends higher into the officer corps with every passing year and particularly afflicts the junior officer corps (by this I mean an involuntary crisis as opposed to those consequent on a ruling group's political choices for military leader characteristics).  A recent Army Majors' promotion board tells the tale.  The selection rate for promoting captains to majors was over 90%.  This compared to Vietnam and post-Vietnam selection rates of between 50% – 60%.  Translated this means every warm body at the rank of captain who avoided serious disciplinary action was promoted to major.  This high selection rate came because of the sustained 1990s drain of junior officers out of the forces as fast as they could go.  There is no sort of quality control under such parameters.  Despite the nearly 1 million troop draw-down of the early 90s the all volunteer force is facing its most difficult challenge since the end of the draft in 1973.

The Clinton Administration's Judeo-Feminist-Maoist p.c. regime inaugurated an unprecedented collapse of morale in the officer corps as well as the broader force.  Coupled with a then-attractive civilian economy this had disastrous and probably irreparable effects on the officer corps of all services.  What started as an involuntary draw-down at the end of the Gulf War snowballed into a self-sustaining voluntary avalanche of Exodus.  Those 'Left Behind' in this Judeo-Marxist Rapture of the military services were all too often those who couldn't hack it 'outside' even in an economy experiencing a labor shortage.   Feminist of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall did her part to drive out thousands of pilots, many of whom possessed Gulf War combat experience.  The continuing shortage of these people who take years to train hovers around 2,000.  These sorts of effects on a decade's worth of officer year groups haven't been seen since the First War to Kill White People and its near 100% casualty rates in junior officers.

Current Requirement

The most recent Secretary of Defense Annual Report (2001) here http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2001/C.pdf lists the end strength budgeted by Congress for FY 2000.  This gives a good sample of actual military manpower strength for all services, active and reserve.  The figures are:

(Active)             (thousands)
Army                    482.2
Navy                    373.3
Marine Corps            173.3
Air Force               355.7

Total:                1,384.4

Army National Guard     353.0
Army Reserve            206.9
Naval Reserve            86.3
Marine Reserve           39.7
Air Force Reserve        72.3
Air National Guard      106.4

Total:                  864.6

(note:  The Reserve figures are for 'Selected Reserves' organized into units with specific monthly and annual training obligations.  There some hundreds of thousands more in the 'Individual Ready Reserve' in longer term mothballs but available for a large mobilization and assignment into vacancies.  Most of these latter have no specific annual training minima but some volunteer for training and schooling duty.  There are also hundreds of thousands of regular retirees of all ages available ranging from their late 30s to late 50s who can also be recalled for 'stateside' and 'desk' work to release younger troops for active field service.)

At first glance, a shortfall of 30,000-50,000 both active and reserve does not appear critical.  Against these requirements the CIA World Factbook reports a theoretical military manpower availability for the USA (ages 15-49) of 70,000,000 males.  The annual male 'year group' cohort is 2,000,000 males (all races) reaching 18 every year.

Quality, Quantity and Volunteer Force Marketing (Recruiting)

To many people's surprise, the strongest opponents of a new selective service draft for three decades, has been the Department of Defense and in particular the U.S. Army.  The Navy and Air Force are a little more open-minded since many would again evade the infantry by 'volunteering' for these services.  But even these services don't want covert draftees nursing secret grudges after the Vietnam Era experience.  Numerous 'bring back the draft' political boomlets have been still-born when the politicians concerned discovered the Department of Defense would actively oppose any attempts at reinstating a draft.  The reasons range from training costs to discipline and troop motivation (lessons learned in the Vietnam Era).  The services prefer longer term volunteers.

The training cost factor alone will stop any attempt at instituting some form of Univeral Military Training based on conscription.  The costs of training real soldiers is high.  The services prefer to invest in 3-4 year volunteers, many of whom will re-enlist, rather than 2 year draftees who will leave.  Initial training times alone can range up to a year, which leaves little time left for utilizing draftees before discharge.  The faster personnel turnover (2 year draftee vs 3-4 year volunteer) also mandates a larger training base establishment to keep the replacement pipeline packed full.  This costs additional money and professional manpower.  Believe it or not, a draftee army of 740,000 (taking the Army's rough Cold War end strength) would produce fewer combat units than an equivalent volunteer force.

Given the current force structure and size, enlistment term lengths and the balance between first term and 'career' troops, the annual accession requirement is less than 200,000 active and reserve.  This is less than 10% of the annual 'class' of males reaching military age.    Such a tiny selection rate alone would raise a firestorm of political opposition, especially when the services inevitably begin to further 'cherry pick' through the selectees for quality.  To this can be added two new curve balls.  These are the questions of girls and queers.

In the all-volunteer force, given the option, commanders prefer to have more intelligent troops rather than less intelligent ones.  On average intelligent soldiers are cheaper to train, perform better once in unit service and have fewer disciplinary problems.  They take better care of expensive equipment and are ultimately cheaper on operational costs.  Innumerable studies have shown a direct correlation between intelligence, combat survival and mission accomplishment.   Since training costs are far higher now than previously the services also prefer, within limits, to re-enlist existing trained servicemen rather than recruit and train new ones.  Those limits are no "career corporals".  People without potential for promotion to leadership levels can plan on leaving after 8 years' service.

In easy recruiting times, such as 1981-86, the services respond to a surplus of potential recruits by raising their enlistment and re-enlistment standards.  As a company commander in the mid 1980s, I directly experienced those easy days.  The Commanding General and the colonels used to say things to me like, "you should have at least 10% of your company barred" (i.e. under a prohibition for re-enlistment).  Disciplinary problems could literally be made to disappear by the simple expedient of a "chapter action" (early discharge proceedings).  And this was the Generals' preferred solution since eager replacements were thronging the recruiting stations.

I disagreed with taking such easy ways out back then.  But they were commanding generals while I was only a commanding captain.  So they got their way.  That's what makes it "The Army".  Sweeping problems under the rug (or literally out the door) has a downside I was aware of back then, and which many more are acutely aware of now.  When the cornucopia of volunteers empties, the force is left without any institutional know-how for dealing with problem soldiers.   This occurs at the same moment personnel quality is in a flat spin downwards and disciplinary problems are therefore rising.

Alert readers have already divined what's coming next.  The quality of personnel in a volunteer force rapidly drops off long before a manpower recruiting crisis manifests itself in absolute numerical deficits from the recruiting objectives.  This is because DoD's first response to personnel recruiting pressure is to start 'lowering the bars'.  That is, it begins enlisting and retaining people it would have previously refused or forced out.  At the start of this article I gave an example of this in the current high promotion board selection rates for major.  On the enlisted side, the first requirement to go is a high school diploma, followed by an expansion in the numbers of mental category CAT IV recruits allowed and a relaxation of physical standards.

Theoretically there are Congressionally set floors for recruiting quality.  These always are politically gamed in the initial stages of a crisis, as when Carter's negro Secretary of the Army Alexander 'adjusted' the testing system to permit CAT V's to be scored as CAT IV's and enlisted.  I suffered from these illiterate retards shortly afterwards as a platoon leader.  Clinton's personnel were engaging in similar minimalist smoke and mirrors in the mid 1990s.  Another system response is to increase pressure on recruiters to unbelievable intensities.  The recruiters respond in kind by also gaming the system at their end, sort of.  Have utterly no doubt another vast recruiting scandal is lurking behind the office doors waiting for whenever USA Today chooses to profile it.

Taken as a whole, the current Department of Defense appears to be roughly 50,000 troops (active and reserve) short with personnel quality an unknown level below the Congressionally mandated 'floor' due to gamesmanship at various levels.  Some of the sub-standard quality shows up in poor unit training performance, drill sergeant sex scandals and equipment operational readiness rates that stay below what current budgeting should permit.  Given the above parameters it's clear the current recruiting crisis centers as much around personnel quality as around gross quantity.

Future Requirements.

So far the Bush Administration has given no hint of any expeditionary force requirement above 200,000 for the next invasion of Iraq.  This new invasion is presently on hold until 2003.   Beyond political timing (Sharon's current war crimes in the West Bank, 2002 Congressional elections) it is my belief the personnel crisis in DoD is delaying this new Iraq War.  Besides being smaller, the 2002 force man for man is far less capable than the 1990 force as a direct result of the quality crisis.  There's also a long-standing but delayed Zionist plan to relieve the Unholy People of some of their military burdens by permanently stationing a US Heavy Corps on the Golan Heights.  This would create a requirement for an extra 300,000 new US Army troops, thus returning to late Cold War levels.  It was the deactivation of a corps in Germany, and an off-setting stateside corps, that allowed the US Army reduction to 482k from 740k.

While the open-ended war on Islam will generate casualties from time to time, I do not foresee a requirement for large numbers of infantry.  The one caveat here is the state of guerrilla insurgency in Columbia-Venezuela-Peru.  The Zionists have been backing some of the movements there by way of getting control of the cocaine trade.  They can be expected to temporarily ease off their campaign to get control of the cocaine supply.  The Chinese however may decide to fill that quartermaster void for strategic reasons of their own.

At the same time our Judeo-Traitor elites have shown they will do all they can to prevent any interference with their nation-killing Immigration Invasion program.  Because of this program they dare not seek any solution involving a revival of the Constitutional State-controlled universal militia system.  Such a truly national army would rapidly become a threat to their continued Imperium.

ZOG-USA also does not need a new selective service draft nor a SWATKWP style mobilization for reasons discussed above.  What it needs is a cattle prod to pre-dispose the correct people (white males) to volunteer for regular service and also to flesh out the skeletonized reserve forces.  At the same time Special People (read Jews and upper class gentile kids) need protection from military service.

I think ZOG will find this happy solution in a mandatory National Labor Service act.  This sort of program will have great appeal to Communist minded people as a method of compelling labor (and hence increasing their political power and control) for all sorts of projects.  Just imagine the potentials in this for a network of government staffed day care centers, highway trash gangs, hospital and nursing home labor forces,  public library volunteers, 'ecology' and all manner of local and state political pork barrel by way of a labor tax.  Faggot groups can have their own units where homosexual pederasts can propagandize to their heart's content.  Tom Ridge could find his 400,000 (or 800,000) 'volunteers' for his utterly unconstitutional federalized homeland defense militia.  The political coalition backing this will turn out to be very eclectic and influential.  A program like this will pre-empt non-Jewish Marxist opposition.

I envision the terms of service being set at 12 months or so, with minimal symbolic pay and every encouragement to barrack at home on the parents.  It will be a requirement for admission into college and possibly to possess a driver's license.  At the same time the Judeo-Lesbian Feminists will be given free reign to implement their Maoist self-criticism circles and anti-white male hate propaganda without any restrictions.   This would make things so miserable for white males they'll gladly flee for refuge (for 4-5 year terms) to the regular forces or the reserves.

There's more than one way to skin the regular mercenary force recruiting cat while keeping white America defenseless with its Constitutional militia in suspended animation.

"Maguire"      01 May 2002